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ll80 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-MERCHANTABLE QUALITY OF TOBACCO 
PRonucrs-Decedent's widow1 and the administrator of his estate2 brought 
a consolidated suit against the American Tobacco Company on six theories 
1 Suit was filed under the Florida wrongful death statute. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01, .02 
(1959). 
2 Decedent sued American Tobacco Company in December 1957, claiming that he 
had incurred lung cancer as a result of smoking defendant's cigarettes. Several months 
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of liability3 for the death of decedent, allegedly caused by lung cancer 
purportedly contracted from the smoking of defendant's cigarettes. At 
the close of plaintiff's evidence, the district court directed a verdict for 
defendant on all counts except those of implied warranty and negligence. 
The jury determined that, although defendant's cigarettes were the cause 
of decedent's lung cancer and resultant death, defendant had no means 
of knowing that the cigarettes would cause cancer. On appeal of the im-
plied warranty charge to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, 
affirmed, one judge dissenting. Defendant cannot be held liable for con-
sequences which were not foreseeable through the use of ordinary human 
skill and foresight.4 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th 
Cir. 1962). 
As early as the middle of the fifteenth century judges and legal writers 
discussed a doctrine of strict liability, in the nature of warranty, relating 
to sellers of food.5 This doctrine was essentially a return to the old com-
mon-law principle of liability without fault6 and provided plaintiffs with 
an alternative cause of action to that based upon negligence. English 
judges originally associated the doctrine with the tort action of deceit, 
but, as contract law developed, it was swept into the action of assumpsit.7 
Today, although uncertainty still exists as to whether this warranty-based 
liability falls within tort or contract law,8 under either theory the effect 
is the same9-that of strict liability, without fault, being imposed upon 
sellers of food.10 Writers reflect several judicially proffered justifications 
for this imposition of strict liability.11 First, the public interest in human 
life, health and safety demands that the consumer be given the maximum 
possible protection. Second, the seller in such situations has induced the 
later decedent died and the claim passed under the Florida survival act to his son, 
as administrator of his estate. Fu. STAT. § 45.11 (1959). 
3 The theories of liability were breach of implied warranty, breach of express 
warranty, negligence, misrepresentation, battery, violation of the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act [52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1958)], Federal Trade 
Commission Act [38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1958)], and the 
Florida Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FLA. STAT. § 500.01 (1959)]. 
4 A petition was granted for rehearing to the Supreme Court of Florida to certify 
the question of the law of Florida. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1959). 
5 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104 & nn. 31 & 32 (1960). 
6 See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in 
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 939 (1957). 
7 PROSSER, TORTS § 83, at 493 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, supra note 5, at 1126. 
8 See R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961); 1 WILLISTON, 
SALES § 197 (rev. ed. 1948). 
fl Reference is made only to the type of liability and not to the procedural distinctions 
such as survival of actions, the statute of limitations, the measure of damages or recovery 
for wrongful death that may exist between tort and contract law. 
10 E.g., Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N.E. 371 (1922); Simon 
v. Graham Bakery, 31 N.J. Super. 117, 105 A.2d 877 (1954). 
11 Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negli-
gence1, 24 TENN. L. REv. 928 (1957); Prosser, supra note 5, at 1124. See also Calabresi, 
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
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consumer to purchase the goods by placing them on the market and by 
representing, at least impliedly, that they are suitable and safe for use. 
Third, the free enterprise system, and consumers as a group, are more 
able to bear the loss than the victim. The rationale implicit in these atti-
tudes is that defective food is so ultrahazardous that, when neither party 
is at fault, the one releasing the injurious force should bear the loss.12 
By analogy, the implied warranty doctrine has been extended beyond 
defective food in many jurisdictions to encompass other products consid-
ered to be sufficiently hazardous.13 
The implied warranty theory does not, however, render the seller of 
a defective commodity strictly liable for all injuries resulting from any 
use to which his product is put. Rather, it extends only to the ordinary 
uses for which the product was intended and sold,14 and the product need 
not be of the highest, or even the average, quality of the industry15 to 
be considered merchantable.16 It has been asserted that the ordinary use 
of cigarettes merely involves the lighting and burning of tobacco and, as 
such, an injury caused by inhaled smoke lies outside the scope of implied 
warranty liability.17 However, common sense indicates that the ordinary 
use of cigarettes includes the inhaling and exhaling of smoke into and 
through the mouth, throat and lungs. In medical circles today it is gen-
erally conceded,18 and the jury in the principal case found,19 that smoking 
can cause cancer. A product cannot be "fit" for a contemplated use, in 
legal parlance, when such use results in serious injury. Thus, if the smoking 
of tobacco products is found to be cancer-forming, every cigarette would 
be unmerchantable, and injuries resulting therefrom should be recoverable. 
Before imposing liability, however, the court in the principal case would 
12 Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944). Cf. Luthringer 
v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P .2d 1 (1948). See generally EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE 
WITHOUT FAULT (1951). See also Plant, supra note 6. 
13 Ross v. Philip Morris Co., Civil No. 9494, W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959, modifying 
164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (cigarette); Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 
854 (1948) (soap); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269" P.2d 413 (1954) (hair 
dye); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (insecticide). 
14 Warranties on the sale of goods are governed by the Uniform Sales Act, a codifica• 
tion of the common-law rules, or the Uniform Commercial Code, in all but a few states. 
UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 15(1), (2); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315. See PROSSER, 
TORTS § 83, at 494 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 
27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 138 (1943). 
15 Wilson v. Lawrence, 139 Mass. 318, 1 N.E. 278 (1885). See 1 WILLISTON, op. cit, 
supra note 8, § 243; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN, 
L. REv. 117, 138 (1943). 
16 "Merchantable" under the Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Commercial Code 
means that a product is fit for ordinary uses and purposes for which it is sold. PROSSER, 
TORTS § 83, at 495 (2d ed. 1955). 
17 See 42 B.U.L. REv. 250 (1962); 50 CALIF, L. REv. 566 (1962). 
1s See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), in 
which plaintiff offered 795 articles allegedly dealing with harmful effects of smoking 
upon the human body. See generally Brumfield, Liabilities of Tobacco Industry: Cancer 
and Its Relationship to Smoking-Is It Actionable?, in 1958 TRIALS AND TORT TR.ENDS 1. 
10 Principal case at 71. 
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require that sellers have a means available to gain knowledge of the prod-
uct's defect. Yet, since implied warranty is a doctrine which has developed 
separately from concepts of negligence, liability should not be dependent 
upon a finding of fault or lack of due care.20 In fact, the weight of 
authority has distinguished the two doctrines by requiring proof of actual 
or implied knowledge of relevant circumstances only in a negligence-based 
action.21 Moreover, the prinicpal reasons underlying a strict liability ap-
proach-the public's interest in life, health and safety, the consumer's 
induced reliance upon the seller and his relative inability to bear the loss-
do not require that the seller have knowledge of the defect.22 
Although the thirty to forty thousand deaths resulting from lung can-
cer each year, which form a potentially extensive basis for litigation, place 
tobacco companies in a precarious situation,23 representatives of a deceased 
smoker are nevertheless not assured of recovery, as the law has been re-
luctant to protect a man from his own folly. In general, courts have limited 
the imposition of strict liability to those situations in which the consumer 
has relied upon the seller,24 a circumstance which can hardly exist when 
the defect is of such a nature that it is or should be known to the consumer. 
Moreover, the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence 
have been made available to sellers in strict liability actions against plain-
tiffs who have later discovered the defect and nevertheless proceeded to 
make use of the product.25 As early as the seventeenth century men were 
writing about the adverse effects of smoking on the human body,26 which, 
although not as pronounced as those from alcohol, have still been dis-
cernible. Recently a great deal of information has been released to the 
American public through current publications and by various health 
20 See note 10 supra. 
21 E.g., Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961); Pietrus v. J. R. Watkins 
Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38 N.W.2d 799 (1949). See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 494; 
1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 8, § 242. 
22 See note 12 supra. For a recent decision following the prevailing authority [e.g., 
Ward v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918); Ryan v. Progressive 
Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile 
Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942)] in holding that knowledge is not a requisite to a 
finding of strict liability, see Sencer v. Carl's :Mkts., Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950), 
where a retailer was held liable for a packaged goad's defects which he had no practical 
means to discover. 
23 This figure represents only the number of annual deaths in the United States 
from lung cancer and does not include the many other injuries that may be attributed 
to smoking or those injuries which are discovered and actionable in the absence of death. 
See Time, July 6, 1962, p. 29. See generally Readers Digest, June 1962, p. 45. 
24 E.g., Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Berger v. E. Berger 
&: Co., 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918); Rosenbush v. Learned, 242 Mass. 297, 136 N.E. 341 
(1922); Wavra v. Karr, 142 Minn. 248, 172 N.W. 118 (1919). See generally PROSSER, op. cit. 
supra note 16, at 494; 1 ·wILusrON, op. cit. supra note 8, § 242; Prosser, supra note 15. 
25 E.g., Arthur v. Merchants' Ice&: Cold Storage Co., 173 Cal. 646, 161 Pac. 121 (1916); 
Hosmer v. Camey, 228 N.Y. 73, 126 N.E. 650 (1920); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 
174 S.W.2d 298 (1943). 
20 Brumfield, supra note 18, at 2. 
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groups on the cancer-causing effects of smoking.27 That these warnings 
have not gone unheeded is evidenced by the fact that a substantial per-
centage of sixty million smokers has switched to filter-tip cigarettes.28 Thus, 
persuasive evidence exists to show that smokers are well aware of the pos-
sible harm caused by smoking tobacco and, as such, should be precluded 
from recovery.29 It is. also common knowledge that overconsumption of a 
variety of products will cause physical harm.30 The standard of merchant-
able quality does not require a product to be fit for an uncontemplated 
use.31 The decedent in the principal case smoked from one to three pack-
ages of cigarettes a day-an extraordinarily large smoking appetite. Med-
ical statistics indicate that he thereby tripled or quadrupled his suscepti-
bility to lung cancer,32 and that he may not have been injured at all had 
he smoked fewer cigarettes-many smokers never contract lung cancer.33 
If, as a question of fact, a decedent's smoking habit is determined to con-
stitute overconsumption, and thus an uncontemplated use of cigarettes, 
as the principal factor causing his injury, the implied warranty theory 
should seemingly be unavailable as a basis of recovery. 
In spite of the smoker's assailable position, cigarette manufacturers are 
presently in a dilemma. The defenses available to them are impractical, 
for disclaimers, warnings or any admission that smoking causes cancer will 
undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the volume of cigarette sales. How-
ever, retailers might find these arguments a useful defense, inasmuch as 
cigarettes would usually comprise but a small part of their total sales. 
Moreover, the statute of limitations in many states may act as a bar to 
plaintiff's claim against either party where the cancer can be proved to 
have lain dormant for the statutory period.34 Retailers will continue to 
be principally liable in about half of the states, and their recourse to indem-
nity by the manufacturer for recoveries resulting from his defective product 
is not wholly adequate.35 The principal case gives rise to a somewhat para-
doxical situation, for a seller of cigarettes may distribute an unmerchant-
27 See id. at 4; Ladies Home J., Dec. 1956, p. 160; Life, June 11, 1956, p. 126; 
Newsweek, June 18, 1962, p. 74; Newsweek, March 19, 1962, p. 78; Readers Digest, 
June 1962, p. 45; Time, March 23, 1962, p. 44; Time, Jan. 25, 1960, p. 64; Time, July 5, 
1954, p. 37; U.S. News &: World Report, July 26, 1957, p. 68. Interestingly, Italy has 
banned all advertising of cigarettes. See Bus. Week, June 16, 1962, p. 29. 
28 See Brumfield, supra note 18, at 35; Readers Digest, July 1961, p. 71. 
29 Analogically, recoveries against manufacturers for harm resulting from the con-
sumption of whiskey are virtually non-existent, since all are presumed to know of its 
possible deleterious effects. See Pritchard v. Liggett &: Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 
302 (3d Cir. 1961). 
30 See REsrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). 
31 See note 16 supra. 
32 See NATIONAL HEALTH EDUCATION COMMITTEE, INC., SUMMARIES OF REPORTS ON 
REsEARCH PROGRESS AGAINST CANCER (1958); Newsweek, June 18, 1962, p. 74. 
33 There are sixty million smokers in the United States and only thirty thousand 
deaths from lung cancer annually. See generally Brumfield, supra note 18. 
34 Contra, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1948). See 62 W. VA. L. REv. 94 (1960). 
35 Prosser, supra note 5, at 1123. 
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able product which may cause serious injury while being exempt from 
implied warranty liability, since, under the present state of the law, the 
burden of loss from such an injury has been consistently left with the 
consumer possessed with knowledge, at least constructive, of the defect. If 
there is to be a change in the allocation of the loss in this area, it will 
apparently come through legislation. 
John E. Mogk 
